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A SURVEY OF ARTICLE III PROCEDURAL

ISSUES CONSIDERED AT THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT DURING ITS
FIRST DECADE
JERRY

R.

SELINGER*

In 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (Federal Circuit) adopted as binding precedent the rulings
of its two predecessor courts: the Court of Customs and Patent Appeal and the Court of Claims.' This adoption instantly created a
substantial body of law on many substantive issues. However, it
provided little precedent on procedural issues since the two predecessor courts (both Article I courts) had little prior exposure to procedural issues arising in Article III litigation.
This is not to suggest that the Federal Circuit was obligated to
create a spectrum of procedural decisions without the benefit of
prior judicial input. To the contrary, there was significant Supreme
Court precedent available on many procedural issues. A wealth of
decisional law from the regional circuits also existed. How Federal
Circuit jurisprudence has developed over the first ten years of that
court's existence and how this unique appellate court has availed
itself of those prior cases is discussed in the following sections.
I. THRESHOLD PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A.

Issues Basic to Jurisdiction

The Federal Circuit, like any federal appellate court, has only
limited jurisdiction. 2 Unlike the regional circuits, however, it has
exclusive jurisdiction of the following:
(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of
this title, except that a case involving a claim arising under any Act of
Congress relating to copyrights, exclusive rights in mask works, or
trademarks and no other claims under section 1338(a) shall be gov* B.S., cum laude in Engineering Science, 1969, S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo, M.S.,
1971, Columbia University, J.D., with highest honors, 1975, George Washington University, Board Certified, Civil Appellate Law, Texas Board of Legal Spe-

cialization. Mr. Selinger is a partner in the Dallas office of Vinson & Elkins
L.L.P.
1. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en
banc).

2. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1993).
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erned by sections 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this title; .... 3
In turn, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) provides that the district courts "shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights
and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts
of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright
4
cases."
At an early stage in its existence, the Federal Circuit opined
that it had both the authority and the obligation to determine
5
whether an appeal lies within its exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
In C.R. Bard,Inc. v. Schwartz,6 the full court rejected the argument
that appeal of jurisdictional questions under § 1338 must be heard
by the regional circuit courts, with only the merits of patent cases to
be considered by the Federal Circuit. 7 "Congress intended this
court to have the exclusive authority under § 1295 to decide the issue.., whether a district court has jurisdiction to entertain a case
under § 1338."8 The Federal Circuit since has delineated the scope
of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction in matters where the lower
court concededly had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1338(a). It also
has considered issues relating directly to the "arising under" requirement of § 1338(a).
1.

"ArisingUnder" Guidelines

In Beghin-Say International,Inc. v. Ole-Bendt Rasmussen,9 the
Federal Circuit outlined its view regarding when a controversy involving a patent sufficiently "arises under" the patent laws to provide a basis for jurisdiction under § 1338(a). In particular, the
court reiterated the established gloss that the Supreme Court
placed on "arising under" jurisdiction: that the "plaintiff must have
asserted [either] some right or interest under the patent laws, or at
least some right or privilege that would be defeated by one or sustained by an opposite construction of those laws." 10
3. Id.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) provides pendant jurisdiction of a claim for unfair
competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, plant variety protection or trademark laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b)
(1993).

5. Aleut Tribe v. United States, 702 F.2d 1015, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see
also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding
that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction to determine whether the district court
properly found no declaratory judgment jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1388).
See discussion infra part I.C.
6. C.R. Bard, Inc., 716 F.2d at 877.
7. Id. at 877.
8. Id.
9. 733 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
10. Id. (citing Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U.S. 282,
286 (1902)). Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. in turn quoted from Pratt v. Paris Gas
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The Beghin-Say plaintiff sought to remove a cloud on title to
two United States patent applications, and to declare that the assignment of those two applications was valid under 28 U.S.C. § 261.
The lower court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction under
§ 1338, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the action
sounded exclusively in contract. That the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) recorded the assignment contract on which suit was
based did not, in the Federal Circuit's opinion, convert the contract
action into one "arising under" the patent laws. 1 In dicta, the
court then identified traditional issues under the patent laws that
would give rise to jurisdiction. These issues included questions of
patent validity, patent infringement, fraud upon the PTO, and patent antitrust issues.12
Dubost v. United States Patent and Trademark Office 13 involved consideration of somewhat different "arising under" issues.
This case was an appeal from a district court decision affirming the
denial of a petition to the Commissioner. A foreign priority date
had been denied because the check accompanying the United States
patent application, filed on the very last day of the priority period,
was unsigned. The Federal Circuit sua sponte considered whether
it had jurisdiction over the appeal. 14 Noting that the district court's
resolution of the case necessarily entailed the construction of 38
Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897); accord Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1988).
11. An attempted removal of a state court contract dispute involving the
scope of a patent license also proved unsuccessful in In re Oximetrix, Inc., 748
F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir. 1984). By contrast, Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control U.S.A.,
Inc., 775 F.2d 268 (Fed. Cir. 1985), recognized that a patent dispute may exist
between parties to a contract that arises under the patent laws. Id. at 273. In
Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 835 F.2d 859 (Fed. Cir. 1987), the court announced that an assertion of noninfringement which is merely a defense to a
state court contract action to enforce a license agreement, while an actual controversy, is not one "arising under" § 1338. Id. at 862. By contrast, it explained, a suit for declaratory judgment that certain devices neither infringe
nor fall within the scope of a patent license (for which royalties would be required) with an assertion that equitable defenses preclude enforcement, does
arise under the patent laws. Id.
12. Beghin-Say Int'l, Inc., 733 F.2d at 1570.
13. 777 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 119 provides:
[An application for patent for an invention filed in this country by any
person who has, or whose legal representatives or assigns have, previously
filed an application for a patent for the same invention in a foreign country
which affords similar privileges in the case of applications filed in the
United States or to citizens of the United States, shall have the same effect
as if the application had been filed in this country on the date on which the
application for patent for the same invention was first filed in such foreign
country, if the application in this country is filed within 12 months from the
earliest date on which such foreign application was filed;
35 U.S.C. § 119 (1993).
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U.S.C. §§ 111 and 119, the court deemed jurisdiction appropriate. 15
An appeal was transferred to a regional circuit court in Consolidated World Housewares,Inc. v. Finkle16 for want of arising under
jurisdiction. Plaintiff Consolidated had entered into a first contract
with Finkle, which recited that Finkle was the sole inventor of an
invention for which he had filed a patent application which was assigned to Consolidated. Thereafter, a dispute apparently arose and
Consolidated entered into a second contract with a third party.
This subsequent contract recited that two other individuals claimed
ownership rights in the Finkle invention, had also filed applications
thereon, and had assigned those applications to the third party.
The second agreement provided that Consolidated would file suit
against Finkle and the third party in order to obtain a resolution on
the issue of inventorship. The district court dismissed the complaint, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust PTO remedies,
although expressing doubt of its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a).
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found jurisdiction wanting
under § 1338(a). The mere presence of a patent issue, it noted,
"cannot of itself create a cause of action arising under the patent
laws." 1 7 The district court did not have original jurisdiction to conduct an interference since 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) grants that function
exclusively to the PTO.' s Merely because a contract action may
involve a determination of inventorship, moreover, did not convert
that contract dispute into one "arising under" the patent laws. 1 9
Disagreement over the contours of "arising under" jurisdiction
resulted in a procedural nadir in Christianson v. Colt Industries
Operating Corp.20 In this suit, ex-employee Christianson sued Colt
for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and for tortious interference with business relationships. Colt asserted justification as a defense-that its conduct was needed to protect trade
secrets-and countersued for misappropriation of trade secrets relating to its M16 production information. Christianson obtained
15. 777 F.2d at 1565. 35 U.S.C. § 111 requires, inter alia, that an application for patent be "accompanied by the fee required by law." 35 U.S.C. § 111

(1993).
16. 831 F.2d 261 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
17. Id. (citations omitted).
18. Id. 35 U.S.C. § 135, inter alia, states that any question of priority of
invention shall be determined by a board of patent interferences (consisting of
three examiners of interferences) whose decision, if adverse to the claim of an
applicant, shall constitute the final refusal by the Patent and Trademark Office
of the claims involved, and the Commissioner may issue a patent to the applicant who is adjudged the prior inventor. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (1993). Appeal may
thereafter be had to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Id.
19. Id.
20. 486 U.S. 800, 800 (1988), rev'g 822 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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summary judgment on both the antitrust and tortious interference
claims. In the process of so ruling, the district court invalidated
nine of Colt's patents and declared all trade secrets relating to the
M16 unenforceable, ostensibly based on 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Colt appealed to the Federal Circuit which, after briefing and
argument, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. An unpublished
order transferred the appeal to the Seventh Circuit. That appellate
court, however, considered the jurisdictional issue de novo, resolved
that the Federal Circuit was "clearly wrong," and transferred the
case back.2 1 In turn, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its prior ruling,
characterizing the Seventh Circuit action as based on "a monumental misunderstanding of the patent jurisdiction granted this
court."2 2 Nevertheless, it then proceeded to address the merits in
"the interest of justice."2 3 The matter thereafter arrived at the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reiterated what a plaintiff is required to
demonstrate for a case to arise under federal patent law by stating
that "[t]he plaintiff must [1] set up some right, title or interest
under the patent laws, or [2] at least make it appear that some
right or privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained
by the opposite construction of these laws." 24 The Court further

qualified the nature of that showing by limiting jurisdiction to only
those cases "in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either
that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law."2 5 Turning to the facts in issue, the Court
concluded that even "[the] most superficial perusal of petitioners'
complaint" showed that patent law did not in any sense create the
21.
22.
23.
24.

798 F.2d 1051, 1056-57, 1062 (7th Cir. 1986).
822 F.2d at 1547.
Id. at 1559-60. The decision of the district court was reversed.
Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-08 (citing Pratt v. Paris Gas Light &

Coke, 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897)).

25. Id. at 808 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborer's Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)). In Vink v. Hendirkus Johannes Schijf Rolkan
N.V., 839 F.2d 676 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the patentee's original complaint sought a
declaratory judgment of patent ownership, an injunction against infringement,
and the imposition of a constructive trust. Id. at 677. An amended complaint
for patent infringement thereafter was filed. Id. The district court, reasoning
that the real issue in the case was ownership of the patent, concluded there was
no federal jurisdiction. Id. This decision was reversed on appeal. Id. at 678.
The Federal Circuit opined that on its face the amended complaint set forth a
patent law question sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. Id. at 677.
Although, presumably, ownership would be raised as a defense, the district
court had erred in considering ownership to determine jurisdiction. Id. at 679.
Indeed, the appellate court generalized, even though a non-federal issue (ownership of the patent) logically would be resolved on the merits before the federal
issue (patent infringement), resolution of the merits should be ignored in determining whether under the well-pleaded complaint rule there is federal jurisdiction. Id.
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26
antitrust or intentional interference claims.
The dispute thus centered around whether patent law was a
necessary element of one of the well-pleaded antitrust claims. This
prompted the Court to review how the well-pleaded complaint rule
operated. For instance, a case presenting a patent law defense did
not for that reason alone "arise under" patent law. This was so
even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiffs complaint, and
even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question
truly at issue in the case. 27 Moreover, the Court cautioned, a claim
supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not form
the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to
each of those theories. 28 By contrast, merely because a claim
makes no reference to federal patent law does not necessarily mean
it does not arise under that law. A plaintiff may not defeat
§ 1338(a) jurisdiction by failing to plead necessary federal patent29
law questions.
Framed by these principles, resolution by the Supreme Court of
the jurisdictional issues became, in its view, straightforward. The
patent law issue, although arguably necessary to at least one "theory" under each claim of recovery, was not necessary to the overall
success of either claim. The well-pleaded complaint rule focuses on
claims, not theories, and "just because" an element that is essential
to a particular theory might be governed by federal patent law does

not mean that a claim "arises under" patent law. 30 Having reached

agreement with the Federal Circuit's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction, the Supreme Court then was compelled to vacate the appel31
late court's decision on the merits.
The Federal Circuit recently explored the outer bounds of "arising under" jurisdiction in Additive Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc. 32 In this case, plaintiff Additive
26. 486 U.S. at 809.
27. Id. The well-pleaded complaint rule was again applied in Speedco, Inc.
v. Estes, 853 F.2d 909 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The appellate court reiterated that
federal jurisdiction is to be determined by what appears in the plaintiff's statement "unaided by anything alleged in the anticipation or avoidance of defenses
.... " Id. at 912. There is a corollary to this rule when analyzing jurisdictional
predicates for declaratory judgment. In that procedural context, the plaintiffs
complaint must be ignored. Rather, to determine whether federal jurisdiction
exists in a declaratory judgment action, the well-pleaded complaint rule is applied "to the action that the declaratory defendant would have brought." Id.

28. 486 U.S. at 810.
29. Id. at 809 n.3.
30. Id. at 811.
31. The Supreme Court politely chastised the Seventh Circuit. It suggested
that in the future the courts of appeals adhere strictly to principles of law of the
case: If a transferee court can find the transfer decision "plausible," its jurisdictional inquiry should end. Id. at 819. The case was then remanded with instructions to transfer it to the Seventh Circuit. Id.
32. 986 F.2d 476 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

1993]

Article III ProceduralIssues

Controls (Adcon) brought an action in a Texas state court against a
patentee, based on letters written by the patentee to Adcon's customers and prospective customers accusing Adcon of patent infringement.
The complaint pled underlying facts without
articulating expressly any specific claim. The action was removed
to federal court.3 3 Adcon's motion to remand the case to state court,
brought on the eve of trial, was denied. 34 After trial, the court
ruled against Adcon, both on its lawsuit and on a counterclaim for
patent infringement. The court further enjoined Adcon from infringing the patent. On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction, and thus properly denied the motion to remand.
According to the Federal Circuit, the district court had characterized Adcon's claim as one for unfair competition. 35 At the outset,
the Federal Circuit relabeled it as a claim for business disparagement. The appellate court explained that the specific averments in
the complaint, describing a dispute over patent infringement and
asserting that the patentee wrote letters to Adcon's customers
warning that Adcon's product infringed, together with allegations
that Adcon had suffered financial loss, stated the elements of that
36
claim under Texas law.

Admittedly, these allegations did not meet the "first prong" of
the Christianson test for "arising under" jurisdiction because the
recast claim did not set up any right, title, or interest under the
patent laws. However, the Federal Circuit explained that a Texas
business disparagement claim requires a plaintiff to prove, as part
of its prima facie case, the falsity of defendant's disparaging statements. 3 7 One disparaging statement, the court observed, was the
accusation that the plaintiff infringed. To prove the falsity of this
accusation, Adcon would be required to show that its product does
not infringe. Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded, Adcon's right to
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of
38
patent law.

In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit distinguished
American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co. 39 That Supreme
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) authorizes removal of an action if the district court
to which it seeks removal has subject matter jurisdiction at the time of removal.
34. Telephone interview with William C. Norwell, Jr. (May 18, 1993).
35. Additive Controls, 986 F.2d at 478 n.1. Adcon's trial counsel characterized it as a claim for interference with business relationships under Texas law.
Telephone interview with William D. Durkee (May 20, 1993).
36. Additive Controls, 986 F.2d at 478 (citing Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins.
Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Tex. 1987)).
37. Id.
38. See also Christopher v. Cavallo, 662 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1981) (ruling
that action for breach of warranty that required proof of copyright infringement
arose under the copyright laws).
39. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
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Court decision, applying Massachusetts law, held that federal
courts lacked jurisdiction over a business disparagement case.
Under then-existing Massachusetts law, however, a defendant was
required to prove the truth of its statements while, by contrast,
under Texas law the plaintiff had the burden of showing the falsity
of allegedly disparaging statements. 40 Moreover, the Federal Circuit opined that, since American Well Works, the Supreme Court
"has uniformly upheld federal jurisdiction over cases in which
plaintiffs right to relief under state law required resolution of a
41
substantial question of federal law."
Additive Controls glossed over the fact that a cause of action
which requires proof of non-infringement by the accused infringer,
rather than infringement by the patentee, reverses the burden
which usually is placed on the patentee. 4 2 A holding that such a
claim implicates patent law nonetheless appears to be within the
outer reaches of "arising under" jurisdiction. 43 Consider, though, a
contract action to collect royalties under a patent license, which
claim requires proof that royalty payments are due because the
products sold are within the scope of the patent claims. Under Additive Controls, it certainly would appear that such a claim arises
under the patent laws, despite an old Supreme Court decision to the
contrary. 44 Christianson, as construed in Additive Controls, expanded, at least implicitly, this aspect of "arising under"
jurisdiction.
By contrast, the appellate court may have erred in divining
from the complaint, which had no labelled claim, the business disparagement claim on which it predicated jurisdiction. The appellate court never addressed the issue of whether unfair competition,
the theory tried below, could be resolved under Texas law without
45
reaching the issue of infringement.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit ignored that the facts pled
also set forth a claim for tortious interference with contract under
Texas law, although anticipating a defense of legal justification or
40. Additive Controls, 986 F.2d at 478-79.
41. Id. at 479 (citations omitted).
42. See Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(holding that the burden of proof is on the patentee to prove infringement by a
preponderance of the evidence).
43. It is well-settled that an action for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement may arise under the patent laws. See infra notes 83-110 and accompanying text.
44. See Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613, 618 (1883) (holding that since "[tihe
controversy between [the parties]... is whether certain goods ... embody the
invention covered by the appellee's patents... [it] does not necessarily involve a
construction of the patents.").
45. See, e.g., Schoellkopt v. Pledger, 778 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989) (writ denied) (finding that a claim of unfair competition may be based on
some finding of an independent substantive tort or other illegal conduct).

1993]

Article III Procedural Issues
6

excuse. 4
Justice Holmes long ago wrote that "the party who brings a suit
is master to decide what law he will rely upon, and therefore does
determine whether he will bring a 'suit arising under' the patent or
other laws of the United States by his declaration or bill."47 As

more recently explained by an appellate court, "if a person is free
not to vindicate his rights in court at all, then he should be free to
assert in court only those rights he chooses." 48 Redefining the
cause of action at the appellate level in Additive Controls to articulate the disparagement theory

-

the basis of jurisdiction -

may

thus have been an inappropriate restriction on the plaintiffs freedom of choice. Of course, the plaintiff needed merely to articulate
its claim to avoid inadvertently creating "arising under"
jurisdiction.
2. Ancillary JurisdictionalIssues
The Federal Circuit also promptly encountered the question of
how to treat federal non-patent issues (or pendent state issues).
Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.,49 involved an action for patent in-

fringement, copyright infringement, and related state claims. The
district court granted a preliminary injunction against copyright infringement. The plaintiff then separated that cause of action under
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, admittedly in an
effort to have any interlocutory appeal by the accused infringer
channeled to a regional circuit. En banc consideration of Federal
Circuit jurisdiction over the preliminary injunction appeal ensued.
At the outset, the court noted that the complaint had pled subject matter jurisdiction under § 1338(a). The appellate court then
explained that its jurisdiction "is defined by the basis of the district
46. The elements of tortious interference with an existing contract are as
follows: a contract between the plaintiff and a third person, knowledge of that
contract by the defendant, inducement by the defendant to the third person to

breach that contract, and resulting breach. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Superior Oil
Co., 640 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). Legal justification or excuse is an
affirmative defense upon which the defendant has the burden of proof. Sterner
v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989). Fairly read, then, the Adcon

complaint pleads the elements of tortious interference and anticipates the patentee's affirmative defense of excuse. 35 U.S.C. § 287 requires a patentee to

notify an infringer of its infringement in the event that the patentee is making

or selling a patented article but fails to mark the product with the patent
number. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1993).
47. Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
48. Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1984). There
is an "artful pleading" doctrine which operates to allow courts under some circumstances to recharacterize a plaintiff's state law claim as a federal claim. It
applies in exceptional circumstances only, not apposite here. See generally Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
49. 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
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court jurisdiction."5 0 The plaintiff had asserted federal jurisdiction
of the entire case based, in part, on its patent claim. Accordingly,
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the entire case resided in the
Federal Circuit. Moreover, separation under Rule 42 did not obviate its exclusive jurisdiction by creating a separate "decision." A
separated claim remains part of the original lawsuit and "judgment
on a separately tried claim is normally not final and appealable un51
til all claims are adjudicated."
Choice of forum similarly was an issue in In re Innotron Diagnostics.5 2 Innotron filed suit for antitrust violations against Abbott
Laboratories. Three weeks later Abbott Laboratories sued Innotron
in the same district for patent infringement. The district court ordered consolidation of the cases pursuant to Rule 42 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Over Innotron's objection, a motion to try
the patent issues first was granted. Innotron then answered the
patent infringement complaint, asserting, inter alia, patent misuse
and an antitrust counterclaim. Not surprisingly, the district court
separated the antitrust issues in Innotron's counterclaim from the
patent issues for trial. Innotron then filed a petition for writ of
mandamus to the Ninth Circuit, demanding reconsolidation. The
Ninth Circuit "denied [the petition] without prejudice to renewal if
the Federal Circuit determined that it has no jurisdiction."53
54
Jurisdiction was, in fact, found by the Federal Circuit.

Whether a patent infringement action was filed in a separate complaint from the antitrust suit or as a counterclaim was considered a
distinction without a difference. 55 In either instance the district
court's jurisdiction over the patent count is based in part on
§ 1338(a). 56 Having crossed the threshold jurisdictional issue, the
Federal Circuit then confronted the question of its authority to consider petitions for writs of mandamus.
Conceding that it lacked "supervisory authority" over the district courts, often the basis for mandamus jurisdiction, the court
then considered whether it had "authority to grant writs of manda50. Id. at 1430.
51. Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956); Cold
Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445 (1956); and
Hebel v. Ebersole, 543 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1976)).
52. 800 F.2d 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
53. Id. at 1079.
54. Id. at 1080.
55. Id.
56. Id. The appellate court noted, however, that it would not:
[Hiave jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court judgment where the
district court's jurisdiction was based solely on diversity, even though the
case may involve interpretation, viability and applicability of a patent license contract, and (even though] those determinations may require consideration of defenses raising patent validity and infringement issues.
In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1080-81 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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57
mus relating to... 'procedural' orders separating issues for trial."
It found authority to exercise mandamus jurisdiction in two instances: (1) "in aid of its jurisdiction" under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 "where
[it] would have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final decision"5 8 ;
and (2) "in proper circumstances" not involving administration, supervision, management or oversight of a district court," but in
which the patent jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit plays a significant role.5 9 The appellate court concluded that it would entertain
the writ because the issue of Rule 42 separation was "intimately
60
bound up with and controlled by the law of patents."

B.

Venue

In 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) was amended, becoming effective
on February 17, 1989. Prior to its amendment, that subpart provided that "(c) [a] corporation may be sued in any judicial district in
which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of
such corporation for venue purposes."6 1 The relevant portion of the
amended subpart now states that "(c) [flor purposes of venue under
this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to
reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced."6 2 Quite clearly, the
amendment enlarged the number of districts in which a corporation
potentially may reside for venue purposes. 63 The 1988 amendments did not, by contrast, change any language in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b), which provides that "(b) [a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of business."64 That section has been consistently phrased for decades,
and construed without reference to § 1391(c). Nevertheless, in VE
57. Id. at 1081. Supervisory authority is possessed by the regional circuits.
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976).
58. Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1081.
59. Id. at 1083-84. Examples when the court had entertained a writ include
In re Newman, 782 F.2d 971 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (discovery order dispute); In re
Mark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (order violating 35 U.S.C. § 282).
The court also gave several examples when it had declined to exercise mandamus jurisdiction. C.P.C. v. Nosco Plastics, Inc., 719 F.2d 400 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(order refusing to disqualif counsel); In re Oximetrix, 748 F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (stay of litigation).
60. 800 F.2d at 1082. The petition was thus considered, but denied.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1976).
62. 28 U.S.C. 1391(c) (1976 & Supp. 1993).
63. See H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 70 (1988) (cited in VE
Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1580 n.18 (Fed.
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991)).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1976).
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Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.,65 the definition of
general corporate residence resulting from the 1988 amendment to
§ 1391(c) was applied to the patent venue provision, § 1400(b). The
focus in VE Holding was on the changed wording in the first clause
of amended § 1391(c): "[flor purposes of venue under this chapter."6 6 The appellate court found in that language a statutory
change making § 1391(c) applicable to all venue provisions in
67
§ 1391 to § 1412, inclusive, including § 1400(b).
The Federal Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court had on
two previous occasions adopted the view that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)
was the exclusive venue provision for patent infringement actions. 68 The first case, Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co.,69
concluded that the Act of 1897, 29 Stat. 695, specifically was
adopted to limit venue in patent actions. According to the Supreme
Court, the legislative history of the 1897 Act explained it was not
intended "to dovetail with the general provisions relating to the
venue of civil suits, but rather that it alone should control venue in
patent infringement proceedings." 70 The statute under scrutiny in
Stonite Products devolved from the 1897 legislation and the
Supreme Court applied the 1897 legislative intent to conclude that
the patent venue provision was the only basis for venue in patent
71
infringement litigation.
The patent venue question resurfaced after the 1948 revision
and recodification of the Judicial Code, 62 Stat. 869. In Fourco
Glass Co. v. TransmirraProducts Corp.,72 the Supreme Court reiterated that "§ 1391(c) is a general corporation venue statute,
whereas § 1400(b) is a special venue statute applicable, specifically,
to all defendants in a particular type of actions, i.e. patent infringement actions." 73 From this premise, the Court concluded that
§ 1400(b) is "the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in
patent infringement actions ....- 74
Despite these two decisions, in VE Holding the Federal Circuit
relied upon Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries,
Inc.,75 for the proposition that the patent venue statute could be
amended indirectly without explicitly rewriting § 1400(b). 76 Bru65.
66.
67.
68.

917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
Id. at 1579.
Id.
Id. at 1077.

69. 315 U.S. 561 (1942).

70. Id. at 566.
71. Id. at 566-67.
72. 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
73. Id. at 228.
74. Id. at 229.
75. 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
76. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
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nette involved the interaction of the patent venue statute and the
alien defendant venue statute. 77 The Brunette court distinguished
Fourco and Stonite on the ground that "§ 1391(d) was not derived
from the general venue statutes that § 1400(b) was intended to replace." 78 The Supreme Court concluded that § 1391(d) was not
venue-restricting legislation, "but rather as a declaration of the
long-established rule that suits against aliens are wholly outside
79
the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and special."
Accordingly, an alien defendant could not rely on § 1400(d) as a
80
shield against suit for patent infringement.
In all events, the Federal Circuit in VE Holding concluded that
venue in patent infringement actions had been altered as to corporate defendants. 8 ' They may be sued for patent infringement in
any district in which
they are subject to personal jurisdiction at the
82
time suit is filed.

C. DeclaratoryJudgments
28 U.S.C. § 2201 authorizes declaratory judgment actions in
the following case: "(a) In a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or
not further relief is or could be sought."8 3 There must be an actual
case or controversy between the parties for jurisdiction under this
statute.8 4 The burden is on the declaratory plaintiff to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction existed at, and
85
has continued to exist since, the time the complaint was filed.

Whether the parties' conduct was sufficient to create an actual controversy, moreover, is on appeal
a question of law which the Federal
6
8
Circuit reviews de novo.

Examination of the "totality of the circumstances" is necessary
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1976) (providing that "[an alien may be sued in

any district.").
78. Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd., 406 U.S. at 713.
79. Id. at 714.
80. Id.
81. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1583.
82. Venue can also be altered by contract. In Warner & Swasey Co. v.
Salvagnini Transferica S.P.A., 806 F.2d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the appellate
court effectuated a choice of forum clause in a license agreement. Dismissal of a
patent infringement suit brought in a jurisdiction other than that specified in
the license agreement was affirmed. Id. at 1046.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1982 & Supp. 1993).
84. Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820 (1986).
85. International Medical Prosthetics Research Assocs., Inc. v. Gore Enter.
Holdings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572, 575 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
86. Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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to determine whether an actual controversy exists.8 7 The Federal
Circuit has devised a two-prong test to ascertain whether the circumstances present an "actual controversy." 8 First, the patentee's
conduct must have created a reasonable apprehension on the part
of the declaratory plaintiff that the patentee will initiate suit if the
declaratory plaintiff continues the allegedly infringing activity.8 9
This first prong is an objective test.90 Second, the plaintiff must
actually have either produced or have prepared to produce a product somehow involved in the infringing activity. 9 1 In Shell Oil Co.
v. Amoco Corp.,92 the court stated that whether a declaratory plaintiff reasonably believed it would be sued depends on whether the
patentee's conduct rose to a level sufficient to indicate an intent to
enforce its patent. 93 The Shell court announced a two-phase subtest to assay the patentee's conduct. The trier of fact looks first "for
any express charges of infringement." 94 If none, it then looks to the
"totality of the circumstances." 95
The Shell opinion emphasized that not every instance in which
a patentee and a potential infringer debate the merits of infringement and/or invalidity gives rise to a justiciable controversy. 9 6 The
Shell court stated that "[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to protect threatened parties, not to drag a non-threatening
patentee into court. We will not encourage litigation by finding a
threat to sue only because a non-threatening party, when approached by a possible infringer, asserted its best arguments in discussion." 97 Yet, Shell does recognize that "a reasonable apprehension of an intent to initiate an infringement suit may be found from
statements made during licensing negotiations." 98 It simply depends on what was said.
Many of the declaratory cases reviewed by the Federal Circuit
over the past ten years involve the question of whether there is a
justiciable controversy. 9 9 Other cases focus on the scope of the
87. Indium Corp. of Am., 781 F.2d at 882 (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v.

Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 272 (1941)).
88. Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
89. Id.
90. Indium Corp. of Am., 781 F.2d at 883.
91. Jervis B. Webb Co., 742 F.2d at 1399.
92. 970 F.2d 885, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. A declaratory plaintiff is not required to admit infringement to create an actual controversy. International Medical Prosthetics Research Assocs.,
Inc. v. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572, 575 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
96. Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d at 889.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Compare West Interactive Corp. v. First Data Resources, Inc., 972 F.2d
1295 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (no actual controversy) and Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d at 885
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threatened lawsuit. The Federal Circuit has instructed that only
specific patent claims actually in controversy can be declared invalid. For example, in Jervis B. Webb Co.,100 the court reversed a
declaration of invalidity of claims not asserted by the patentee. No
declaratory judgment was warranted, the reviewing court opined,
because the accused infringer had not produced devices falling
under the unasserted claims, the patentee had not made general
allegations of infringement, and no ground of invalidity inherently
applied to all of the claims of the patent. 10 1
The Federal Circuit has also held declaratory jurisdiction to be
discretionary. In Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,102 the district court stayed a declaratory judgment action for patent invalidity pending resolution of a state court
suit by the patentee to collect license royalties. The Federal Circuit
agreed that the district court had acted within its discretion. 0 3 By
contrast, in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Norton
Co.,104 the Federal Circuit found dismissal of a declaratory judgment action based on a pending interference proceeding to have
constituted an abuse of discretion. Reversal was warranted (1) because the interference proceeding would not ameliorate the infringement issues presented in the declaratory judgment action,
and (2) because the declaratory plaintiff would likely suffer signifi10 5
cant prejudice from delay.
The Federal Circuit also has reviewed declaratory judgment actions in the context of forum shopping. In Kahn v. General Motors
Corp.,16 the Federal Circuit held that "'as a principle of sound judicial administration, a first [filed] suit should have priority' absent
special circumstances." 10 7 The Federal Circuit also stated that
"[t]wo situations [commonly] justify a departure from the first-filed
rule of priority."l0 s One situation is the "customer action," "where
the first suit is filed against a customer who is simply a reseller of
the accused goods, while the second suit is a declaratory action
brought by the manufacturer" of the goods against the patentee. 10 9
(no actual controversy) with Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc.,
846 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (dismissal of declaratory judgment action for want
of controversy reversed) and Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc.,
824 F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (dismissal for want of justiciable case or controversy reversed).
100. 742 F.2d 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
101. Id. at 1399.
102. 804 F.2d 129 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

103. Id.
104. 929 F.2d 670 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

105. Id. at 674-75.
106. 889 F.2d 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
107. Id. at 1081 (quoting William Gluckin & Co. v. International Playtex
Corp., 407 F.2d 177, 178 (2d Cir. 1969)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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The second situation is where forum shopping alone motivates the
choice of situs for the first suit: "The manufacturer who is charged
with infringing a patent cannot stretch the Federal Declaratory
Judgments Act to give him a paramount right to choose the forum
for trying out questions of infringement and validity. He is given
an equal start in the race to the courthouse, not a headstart."" x0
D. Appealability
Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit normally is limited to appeals of final decisions within its subject matter.l"l An exception to
this rule of finality is the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction,
inter alia, over interlocutory decisions relating to injunctions, when
arising from matters within its exclusive jurisdiction. 1 2 In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure authorize exceptions in the discretion of the district
court. 1 1 3

Several judicially created exceptions also have been

created.
1.

InterlocutoryAppeal Issues

Holmes v. Bendix Corp.114 presented the question of whether
denial of a motion for summary judgment of infringement constituted denial of injunctive relief. Jurisdiction, thus, was asserted
110. Id. at 1079 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-T Fire Equip. Co., 342
U.S. 180, 185 (1952)).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1976 & Supp. 1993).
112. Id. § 1292(c). The Federal Circuit also has exclusive jurisdiction over

judgments in matters over which it has exclusive jurisdiction and which are
final, except for accounting and interlocutory decisions relating to the Court of
International Trade and the United States Claims Court. Id. § 1292(c)(2) &(d).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) states:
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would
have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to
it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That
application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge
thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1993) (emphasis in original). Rule 54(b) states in part:
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 54.

114. 713 F.2d 792 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c). 115 None of the summary judgment motions, however, "alerted the judge that he was passing on injunctive
relief indirectly." 1 16 Moreover, the Federal Circuit noted, Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relates not to an injunction,
but to a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or declaratory judgment. 1 17 Accordingly, to invoke interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, a party "at least must point out something he said or did to
alert the court that it would be passing indirectly on the availability
of injunctive relief."118
ChaparralCommunications, Inc. v. Boman Industries,Inc. 119
involved the counterpart situation of a partial summary judgment
against the patentee. The district court had granted summary
judgment of patent unenforceability, waiver, and attorney fees, but
had reserved for trial several other patent and unfair competition
claims, and had denied a motion for Rule 54(b) certification. The
patentee argued that the grant of summary judgment against it
was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 because it had the effect of
denying the patentee's request for injunctive relief.120 On the authority of Holmes, the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal because
the district judge was never alerted that his ruling on the summary
judgment motion might require him to pass on injunctive relief
12 1
indirectly.
Subsequently, in Woodard v. Sage Products, Inc., 122 the Federal Circuit considered whether an order granting summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of one of several defendants is
immediately appealable if the district court neither certifies the issue under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), nor enters a separate final judgment
under Rule 54. The patentee argued that the summary judgment
order was immediately appealable because it effectively denied permanent injunctive relief against the dismissed defendant. 1 23 "A series of five salient Supreme Court opinions" were relied upon by
both parties. 12 4 The Federal Court opined that these five decisions
115. Id. at 793.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56).

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 793-94.
798 F.2d 456 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Id. at 457.
Id. at 458.

122. 818 F.2d 841 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc).

123. Id. at 844. The Federal Circuit at the outset determined that deference
to the law as interpreted by the circuit in which the district court was located
was inappropriate, since the matter of § 1292(c) appealability related to an issue of its own appellate jurisdiction. Id.
124. Id. at 845. The cases relied upon were: Carson v. American Brands,
Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981), remanded, 645 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1981); Gardner v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978); Switzerland Cheese
Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Home's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23 (1966); Baltimore Contractors,
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have not uniformly been construed among regional circuits.1 2 5 All
circuits, however, were in agreement that "the threshold requirement is that the order must have the effect of the grant or denial of
an injunction ... "126
Then, the Federal Circuit determined that one of the five cases,
Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,127 fairly synthesized the criteria

espoused by the Supreme Court. In particular, the Federal Circuit
borrowed from Carson a three-step test for the appropriateness of
an interlocutory appeal of injunction-affecting orders under
§ 1292(c): "(a) that the order be injunctive in nature, (b) that it
cause a serious, if not irreparable, consequence and (c) that the order can be effectively challenged only by immediate appeal." 128 Inevitably, the Federal Circuit discussed several of its prior decisions,
including Holmes and Chaparral. It "clarified" those prior decisions
to eliminate any requirement that a litigant "specifically alert a district court that its ruling on an interlocutory matter in effect
denies
129
an injunction if the pleadings make that self-evident."
Finally, Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Laboratories,Inc.130 dealt with
consideration of what constitutes an interlocutory order involving
an injunction. After a jury verdict in favor of the patentee, the district court had entered a permanent injunction against the infringer. The infringer moved to stay the permanent injunction
pending an appeal on the merits, but that motion was denied both
by the district court and by the Federal Circuit. The infringer then
appealed the district court's denial of the stay of the permanent injunction. The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal because "denial
of a stay of [the] post-trial [permanent] injunction.., was neither a
'final decision' nor within the appellate court's jurisdiction over interlocutory orders." 131 The stay motion could not be converted into
13 2
a § 1292 dispute.
2.

The Bootstrap Effect

13 3
In Gerber Garment Technology, Inc. v. Lectra Systems, Inc.,
a series of rulings on summary judgment and preliminary injunc-

Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955); General Elec. Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals,
287 U.S. 430 (1932); Woodard, 818 F.2d at 846-49.
125. Woodard, 818 F.2d at 850.
126. Id. (emphasis in original).
127. 450 U.S. 79 (1981), remanded, 654 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1981).
128. Id. Applying this test, interlocutory appeal was not deemed appropriate. Id. at 855. The patentee had failed to seek a preliminary injunction. Id. at
854. The Federal Circuit, moreover, refused to consider factual arguments on
harm which had not first been considered by the trial court. Id.
129. Woodard, 818 F.2d at 855.
130. 782 F.2d 992 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
131. Id. at 993 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1982)).
132. Id.
133. 916 F.2d 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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tions (none of which was independently appealable) combined synergistically to create an appealable decision. The patentee had
asserted infringement of three patents. It moved, inter alia, for
summary judgment of infringement or, in the alternative, for a preliminary injunction. Conversely, the accused infringer moved for
summary judgment that claims of the remaining patent were invalid for obvious-type double patenting. The district court granted
summary judgment of invalidity, denying the patentee's motion for
summary judgment and its request for a preliminary injunction.
The court made no findings on the subsidiary factors for prelimi34
nary injunction.'
At the outset, the Federal Circuit addressed "that procedural
quirk in the law whereby the nonappealable becomes reviewable
and piecemeal litigation becomes permissible."13 5 The grant of
summary judgment of invalidity was an interlocutory partial judgment. 13 6 The denial of the patentee's motion for summary judgment was interlocutory. 13 7 Moreover, the trial court's failure to set
forth any findings relating to denial of the preliminary injunction
would normally make that ruling "incapable of review." 138
Faced with this record, the Federal Circuit made an assumption that "the [district] court denied the preliminary injunction because its summary judgment of invalidity ...precluded injunctive
relief."139 The appellate court, thus, reviewed the merits of an
otherwise unappealable summary judgment on the theory that the
ruling was "closely interrelated factually" to the preliminary injunction.140 Consequently, "through the magic of Section [1292(c)(1)],
the unappealable partial judgment.., must be reviewed as though
it were appealable, and the result of that review in this case is to
14 1
affirm the denial of the motion for preliminary injunction."
In Intermedics, the Federal Circuit considered the argument
that, in effect, an order dismissing a declaratory judgment action
because of a prior-filed state court contract action (while technically
entry of a dismissal) was simply a "stay" and not a final appealable
134. Id. at 685.
135. Id.

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Gerber, 916 F.2d at 686.

139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn.,

804 F.2d 129, 134 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
141. Id. A district court decision on the merits frequently will be entered
without a determination of costs or with an award of reasonable attorney fees,

to be determined upon further hearing. A judgment which resolves all issues
except the amount of costs and attorney fees is, however, final under § 1295.
Johannsen v. Pay Less Drug Stores North-West, Inc., 918 F.2d 160, 163 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
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order.142 The reviewing court recognized the many cases holding
an order staying a court's own proceedings to be not appealable,
and the rejoinder that the district court action was practically final. 143 It then finessed this aspect of appealability by finding jurisdiction because of the trial court's refusal to issue an injunction.
Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc.144 was another case in which the Federal Circuit considered a non-appealable interlocutory order ancillary to another matter which was appealable. In particular, the
district court had granted a preliminary injunction staying proceedings filed by the patentee in another district and had granted a motion to join a third party as a counter-defendant. The Federal
Circuit considered and affirmed the normally non-appealable joinder order, because it had jurisdiction over the injunction appeal.14 5
146
In Scripps Clinic & Research Foundationv.Genentech, Inc.,
the court reviewed a partial denial of summary judgment of infringement. The district court had granted summary judgment
against the patentee that, inter alia, its claims were: (1) unenforceable based on inequitable conduct; (2) invalid for failure to comply
with 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 251; and (3) invalid for failure to comply
with the best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. The district
court also granted summary judgment of infringement as to some,
but not all claims. Final judgment was entered and both sides
appealed.
On this record, the Federal Circuit agreed that the denial of
summary judgment of infringement of some claims was appealable.
The appellate court, relying on the law of the Ninth Circuit, found
that an appeal from a final judgment may include challenges to all
rulings which produced the judgment, whether or not independently appealable. However, because of the undeveloped record,
the Federal Circuit considered only questions of law relating to the
14 7
denial of that motion.
3.

'Almost" Final Judgments

With limited exceptions, only final decisions are appealable.
One exception is Rule 54 which authorizes a district court to create
a final judgment "upon an express determination that there is no
just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
142. Id. at 134. The Federal Circuit also confirmed that the Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, precluded grant of an injunction to stay such a proceeding in state court. Id.
143. Id.
144. 909 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

145. Id. at 1461, 1464.
146. 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 1991 WL 525082 (Fed. Cir.
Apr. 30, 1991).
147. Id. at 1583.
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judgment." 148 Not surprisingly, there have been several appeals
taken without Rule 54 certification, but which did not resolve all
issues against all parties.
For instance, in Veach v. Vinyl Improvement Products Co., 14 9
the patentee had asserted both patent infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets. The district court granted the accused infringer's motion for summary judgment as to the claim for patent
infringement, while denying a corresponding summary judgment
motion on the trade secret cause of action. The district court also
closed discovery. The patentee appealed and the accused infringer
moved to dismiss the appeal as premature. The Federal Circuit
granted that motion, noting that there was no final order and no
15 0
basis for interlocutory appellate jurisdiction as to any ruling.
In Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc.,151 the Federal Circuit considered, inter alia, the implications of an order for separate trial
under Rule 42. The case presented one patent and six non-patent
counts based on a common set of facts. In the course of concluding
that jurisdiction for the entire case belonged exclusively to it, the
Federal Circuit noted that a judgment on a separately-tried claim is
normally not final and appealable until all claims of the case are
adjudicated. 15 2 A similar result was obtained in Johannsen v. Pay
Less Drug Stores, North West, Inc.15 3 The district court in Johannsen had entered a judgment that concluded all liability issues between the parties, although it had stayed proceedings on injunctive
relief and accounting for unfair competition. Both sides separately
requested the district court to certify its liability rulings under Rule
54(b), but an appeal was taken before the trial court ruled on certification. The Federal Circuit sua sponte dismissed the appeal, explaining that there was no final decision because both unfair
competition accounting and proceedings on injunctive relief re15 4
mained unresolved.
Recently, in W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. InternationalMedical ProstheticsResearch Associates, Inc.,155 the Federal Circuit considered aspects of Rule 54 certification. The district court had
bifurcated a patent misuse defense and antitrust counterclaim from
the patentee's infringement claim and the accused infringer's other
affirmative defenses. Trial proceeded on the latter matters, and
judgment of noninfringement, patent invalidity and laches was en-

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

R. Crv. P. 54.
700 F.2d 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1391.
747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
Id. at 1430-31.
918 F.2d 160 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
FED.

154. Id. at 162.

155. 975 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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tered and certified pursuant to Rule 54. Appellee challenged the
certification. The Federal Circuit recognized that Rule 54 allows
for certification only of one or more but fewer than all of the claims
or parties. The Federal Circuit stated that "[r]ule 54 does not come
into play when mere defenses are left unadjudicated, but only when
additional claims, counterclaims or third-party claims are left
unadjudicated." 156 Rule 54 certification was proper, though, "because the infringement claim was finally adjudicated and there
[was] more than one claim for relief."1 57 Indeed, the court observed, even a factual overlap on only tangential issues or one aspect of a counterclaim would not create an abuse of discretion in the
event of Rule 54 certification.' 58
Two judicially created exceptions to the final judgment rule
were expressly incorporated into the jurisprudence of the Federal
Circuit in Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Reeves Brothers, Inc.19 One is
160
the "collateral order" doctrine and the other is the Gillespie rule.
The collateral order doctrine, as adopted by the Federal Circuit, has
three elements. First, the trial court "must conclusively determine
the disputed question. Second, it must resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action. Third, it must be
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." 16 1 The
Supreme Court in Gillespie set forth two criteria to be followed in
determining whether an order relating to the pleadings should be
considered sufficiently final to permit appellate review. First, "do
stricken allegations raise issues separate and distinct from those
raised by the remaining allegations?" 162 Second, "will the goal of
judicial economy be served?" 163 The broad language of Gillespie allows for the exercise of immediate appellate jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 where the effect of an order is "fundamental to the
further conduct of the case." 1 6 4 However, the Gillespie rationale

has been limited to the unique facts of its case, to ensure § 1291
1 65
retains its significance.

156. Id. at 863.
157. Id. at 864.
158. Id.
159. 736 F.2d 1508 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
160. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (collateral order); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
161. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 736 F.2d at 1510. The Federal Circuit rejected a
mandatory fourth condition that the collateral appeal present a "serious and
unsettled" question, but recognized it was an additional, albeit discretionary,
consideration. Id.
162. 379 U.S. at 152-54.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 154.
165. Jeanette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States, 803 F.2d 1576, 1583 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
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Turning to the facts in issue in Tenneco Resins, the district
court had refused to allow an accused infringer to amend its pleadings and allege affirmative defenses of invalidity and unenforceability, because of unreasonable delay. 16 6 The accused infringer took
an immediate appeal, which the patentee moved to dismiss. The
Federal Circuit recognized that infringement, validity, and unenforceability are "distinct and separate issues."167 Then the court
considered whether judicial economy would be served by allowing
the appeal. 168 It pragmatically recognized that issues of validity
and unenforceability are "hopelessly intermingled" with the remaining issues. 16 9 Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the appeal
was denied.
Several interesting procedural issues were presented to the
Federal Circuit in In re InternationalMedical ProstheticsResearch
Associates, Inc.170 The case involved a petition for writ of mandamus and an appeal, both based on the district court's disqualification of one of the two law firms representing the petitioner/
appellant. The appellate court recognized that, in appropriate circumstances, mandamus was a proper vehicle for review of non-final
matters. 17 ' However, it concluded that the circumstances of that
case did not require grant of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. 17 2

By contrast, following the law of the Ninth Circuit

(wherein the district court resided) the Federal Circuit reviewed on
appeal the order disqualifying counsel under the collateral order
73
exception.1
A different result occurred in Quantum Corp. v. Tandon
Corp.174 There, the alleged infringer unsuccessfully moved for a
separate trial on the issues of willfulness and reissue intervening
rights. The accused infringer also had been ordered to produce attorney opinion letters relating to its defense against willful infringement. An immediate appeal was taken, with jurisdiction
predicated on the collateral order doctrine. The Federal Circuit
concluded that the two orders were not immediately appealable because they did not satisfy the third requirement of the collateral
order doctrine. Each order was effectively reviewable on appeal
17 5
from a final judgment.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Tenneco Resins, Inc., 736 F.2d at 1509.
Id. at 1511.
Id. at 1512.
Id.
739 F.2d 618 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 619-20.
Id. at 620.
Id.

174. 940 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
175. Id. at 644. The question, however, is whether disclosure of privileged

information will cause irreparable harm if the disclosure is later found to be
erroneous.
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Third PartyDiscovery Issues

On several occasions, the Federal Circuit has been presented
with appeals from orders relating to third party discovery. In Heat
& Control, Inc. v. Hester Industries,Inc.,176 the collateral order doctrine was applied to determine whether an order quashing thirdparty discovery was appealable. At the outset, the Federal Circuit
opined that a discovery order incident to a pending action is "ordinarily not subject to appeal," and an order quashing a subpoena is
"typically not a final judgment." 177 It observed, however, that the
district court which heard the motion to quash was not the same
court in which the main action was being litigated. Thus, the order
quashing the subpoena appeared to meet all three criteria under
the collateral order doctrine.178
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit considered whether a different result should obtain because it has nationwide subject matter
jurisdiction. However, the Federal Circuit deemed this irrelevant
and held the order appealable. 179 By contrast, in Micro Motion,
Inc. v. Exac Corp.,180 the Federal Circuit held that an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena directed to a non-party, entered
by a court other than the court in which the action is pending, was
81
interlocutory and non-appealable.'
II.

REVIEW OF TRLAL COURT CONTROL OVER LITIGATION

As discussed above, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction of, inter alia, "an appeal from a final judgment of a district
court ... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in
part, on section 1338 of [Title 28] ..... 182 Consequently, "a district
court exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1338 is
183
bound by the substantive patent law of [the Federal] Circuit."
Concomitantly, that circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review any
other matters resolved by the trial court if it acquired jurisdiction
176. 785 F.2d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
177. Id. at 1021.
178. It conclusively determined the disputed question, resolved an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and was effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Id.
179. See also Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng'g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207,
1209 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding an order quashing a subpoena issued to a nonparty final and appealable).

180. 876 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
181. Id. at 1576. The appellate court did note several exceptions to its ruling. These included the collateral order doctrine and the possibility of mandamus or seeking certification by the district court of a legal question in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). No exception was apposite on the record.
Id.
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
183. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastics Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
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under § 1338.184 However, "as a matter of policy, the Federal Circuit shall review procedural matters, that are not unique to patent
issues, under the law of the particular regional circuit court where
appeals from the district court would normally lie." 185 The exact
parameters of this ruling, observed by the court in PanduitCorp. v.
Allstates Plastics Manufacturing Co., will be unclear "until such
18 6
procedural matters are presented to this court for resolution."
A-

Unique ProceduralMatters

When a procedural issue relates to the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, decisions of the regional circuit may be used for guidance, but deference is inappropriate. In Sun-Tek Industries,Inc.
v. Kennedy Sky Lites, Inc.,187 the appellate court focused sua sponte
on whether an order increasing a supersedeas bond is appealable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. An apparent conflict between the Second
Circuit and the Fifth Circuit was noted but then finessed. The Federal Circuit assumed that such orders were appealable.1 8 8 However, because only a finding about counsel within the order was
being challenged and that finding was unrelated to the relief
granted in the order, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 18 9
Similarly, in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Releasomers, Inc.,190 the Federal Circuit announced that since dismissal for want of "actual controversy" jurisdiction implicates the
jurisprudential responsibilities in a field within its exclusive jurisdiction, it would not be bound by decisions of the regional circuit
courts. 191

An analogous situation relates to how the Federal Circuit resolves conflicts among its panel decisions. As a basic premise, prior
decisions of a panel of the court are binding precedent on subse184. Id.
185. Id. at 1574-75. In Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir.
1986), the appellate court explained that a motion to amend was "a procedural
matter not unique to the field of patent law [and it applied] the discernible law

of the [regional] circuit." Id. at 666. The court also refused to consider the
denial of a motion for summary judgment that antitrust violations had occurred. Id. at 669.
186. 744 F.2d 1564, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2957
(1992) (citing Panduit, 744 F.2d 1564).

187. 856 F.2d 173 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1099 (1989).
188. Id. at 176.
189. Id. at 177. In Atari Corp. v. Seagate Technology, 847 F.2d 826 (Fed.
Cir. 1988), the Federal Circuit considered a disqualification order, applying the
law of the regional circuit. The order was certified for review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) and considered on the merits by the Federal Circuit. 847 F.2d

826.
190. 824 F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
191. Id. at 954 n.3.
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quent panels "unless and until overturned en banc." 19 2 Nevertheless, conflicts sometimes do occur. When a direct conflict does arise,
19 3
the precedential decision is supposedly the first.
B.

Construingthe Federal Rules

At least some of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
quasi-jurisdictional implications. One example is motion practice
under Rule 50. Terminology under that rule recently has changed.
As of December 1, 1991, the term "directed verdict" in Rule 50(a)
has been replaced by the phrase "judgment as a matter of law" and
a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment n.o.v. is now a "motion for judgment as a matter of law after verdict." 194 Nevertheless, the substance of the rule appears unchanged.
Rule 50(a) requires a party moving for judgment as a matter of
law to specify the grounds upon which the motion is based. A party
who fails to specify an issue in its motion "may not subsequently
challenge the jury's verdict on that issue."195 After the close of the
accused infringer's evidence in Kinzenbaw, the patentee moved for
directed verdict on a number of issues, but failed to do so on a
§ 102(a) issue. The trial court denied the motion for directed verdict. It submitted all contested issues (including the § 102 issue) to
the jury, which found an anticipatory prior use. Subsequently, the
trial court denied the patentee's Rule 50(b) motion which encompassed every issue found against it. The Federal Circuit refused to
consider the § 102(a) issue because of the patentee's failure to raise
196
that issue in a Rule 50(a) motion.
In so ruling, the Federal Circuit observed that Rule 50(a) requires that "[a] motion for directed verdict shall state the specific
grounds therefor."197 Accordingly, a party who fails to specify an
issue in its motion for directed verdict "may not subsequently challenge the jury's verdict on that issue, which is conclusive on that
point." 198 Moreover, even "[a] specific reference to the issue in a
motion for judgment n.o.v. does not cure a prior failure to include

the issue in the motion for a directed verdict and, thus, does not
192. UMC Elects. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).

193. Newell Co. v. Kenney Mfg. Co. 864 F.2d 757, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1989), ex-

plained, by contrast, that to resolve conflicts among CCPA decisions, the "later

decisions control because that court always sat en banc." Id. at 1011.
194. FED. R. Crv. P. 50(a), (b).
195. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 387-88 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 387.
198. Id.
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preserve the issue for appeal." 19 9 A motion under Rule 50(a) may
thus relate to the appellate court's jurisdiction. Kinzenbaw did not
explicitly address this issue, nor did it address the question of
which circuit's law to apply. Trial had been held in the Northern
District of Iowa. Nevertheless, the only Rule 50 authority cited by
the appellate court was from the United States Court of Appeals for
20 0
the District of Columbia Circuit.
Failing to move for judgment under Rule 50(b) after making a
timely motion under Rule 50(a) may be somewhat less disastrous.
In Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equipment Leasing, Inc.,20 1 the Federal
Circuit initially reversed a jury verdict of laches for lack of evidence. 20 2 During the course of proceedings on rehearing, the court
learned the patentee had not moved for judgment as a matter of law
after the verdict on laches, while having previously moved for judgment as a matter of law on that issue. The patentee's failure to so
move precluded the appellate court from reversing and rendering.
Instead, it had the authority "only to order a new trial on the
2 3
issue." o
The harm caused by failing to move under Rule 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law can be somewhat ameliorated in one other
fashion. In Power Lift, Inc. v. Lang Tools, Inc.,204 the patentee had
failed to move for judgment under Rule 50(a) but did move for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict and for a new trial. 20 5 The
appellate court agreed that the Rule 50(b) motion should be disregarded, but considered the patentee's timely motion for new trial on
the very same issues. 20 6 However, reviewability of a jury verdict
in the absence of a Rule 50(b) motion
for sufficiency of the evidence
20 7
is limited to plain error.
The Federal Circuit in Biodex considered the question of
whether deference to regional circuit law is appropriate in deciding
if a post-verdict motion is a prerequisite to appellate review of the
sufficiency of the evidence underlying a jury verdict. Initially, the
199. Id.
200. Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 387. Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc.,
946 F.2d 850 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2957 (1992), noted an

"apparent conflict" in the Federal Circuit about whether to apply regional law

to Rule 50 practice. Id. at 855 n.5. It then observed that the conflict was
merely theoretical, because the applicable law is uniform. Id.
201. 872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, A.C. Ackerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
202. Id. at 993.
203. Id. at 995 (citations omitted).
204. 774 F.2d 478 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b), 59.
206. Power Lift, Inc., 774 F.2d at 480. Rule 50 involves legal sufficiency of
evidence while Rule 59 is based on factual sufficiency.

FED.

R. CIv. P. 50, 59.

207. Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 854 (Fed. Cir.

1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2957 (1992) (limiting review to plain error).
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Federal Circuit reviewed its prior case law to understand the origins of the rule of deference. The court observed that deference did
not extend to all procedural issues merely because that issue might
separately arise in a case having nothing to do with the patent
laws, concluding that when there is "an essential relationship between our exclusive statutory mandate or our functions as an appellate court and the relevant procedural issue, that relationship
provides an additional reason why resolution of the procedural issue may be committed to our jurisprudence." 20 8 The precise issue
before it was "not jurisdictional, but closely related to the exercise
of our mandate." 20 9 The Federal Circuit then concluded that
although the issue at hand was procedural, it was appropriate to
adopt its own single rule, rather than rely on evolution of law in the
2 10
regional circuits.
The Federal Circuit has also considered jury submissions
under Rules 49 and 51. By way of overview, federal practice normally allows a general verdict to be submitted to the jury, with or
without "special interrogatories." 2 11 Timely objection generally is
required to preserve error as to the form or language of the court's
instructions. 2 12 A party must object to the form of special interrogatories before the jury retires. 2 13 It does not matter which party
has the burden of proof.2 14 Similarly, if a party believes that an

issue has been omitted or not adequately dealt with in the court's
interrogatories, proposed additional interrogatories must be tendered to the court before the jury retires. Otherwise, any complaint
about the issue as submitted is waived. 2 15 Where a party submits
correct special issues, their rejection by the court preserves error
and precludes express or implied findings in support of the verdict. 21 6 By contrast, if a necessary issue of fact is omitted from the
instructions without objection, the trial court may make express
findings on such issues. 2 17 Alternatively, the trial court is deemed
208. Id. at 858.
209. Id.

210. The standard then adopted was not to review the sufficiency of the evidence after a jury verdict absent some post-verdict disposition, either by a deferred ruling or upon a post-verdict motion. Id. at 862.
211. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Griffith, 265 F.2d 489, 493-94 (5th Cir. 1959);
FED. R. Crv. P. 49.
212. Nimnicht v. Dick Evans, Inc., 477 F.2d 133, 134 (5th Cir. 1973).
213. J.C. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Trailways Bus Sys., Inc., 689 F.2d 599, 602 (5th
Cir. 1982).
214. Id.
215. MBank Ft. Worth, N.A. v. Trans Meridian, Inc., 820 F.2d 716, 723-24

(5th Cir. 1987); REO Indus., Inc. v. Pangaea Resource Corp., 800 F.2d 498, 501
(5th Cir. 1986).

216. Ford Motor Co. v. Dallas Power &Light Co., 499 F.2d 400, 408 (5th Cir.
FED. R. Crv. P. 49(a).
217. Murtagh v. University Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810 (5th Cir.), cert. de-

1974);

nied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974).
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to have made a finding on the issue in accordance with the judgment entered. 2 18 However, the trial court may not make a finding
2 19
on a missing ultimate issue.
At times, the Federal Circuit has appeared inconsistent in articulating guidelines for jury submissions by trial courts. In Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,220 for example, the Federal Circuit
approved submission of the question of obviousness to a jury. It
cautioned, though, that such submission should be accompanied by
detailed special interrogatories designed to elicit responses and appropriate instructions. 22 1 Shortly thereafter, in American Hoist &
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc.,222 the Federal Circuit lectured a
district court not to solicit only a legal conclusion from the jury and
then act as fact finder. 22 3 Similarly, in White v. Jeffrey Mining Machinery Co. ,224 the appellate court announced that "interrogatories
to juries should be directed to facts, not to questions of law such as
obviousness, fraud, and claim interpretation, which constitute the
basis for instructions to the jury ... "225
Subsequent rulings by the Federal Circuit, however, appear to
have lessened the import of the White and American Hoist pronouncements. Weinar v. Rollform, Inc.,226 for instance, explained
that because of Rule 49, appellate courts cannot compel the use of
special interrogatories. Indeed, the court observed, it would be inappropriate to vacate a judgment on a jury verdict solely for failure
22 7
to submit special interrogatories.
The Federal Circuit also has been somewhat inconsistent about
the scope of review of a judgment based on a jury verdict. In White,
there was an absence of stated findings. The Federal Circuit reversed denial of a Rule 50(b) motion, based on its perception that
there was substantial agreement on the underlying facts. It refused to accord to the jury's findings the substantial evidence/reasonable jury standard of review. 2 28 By contrast, Perkin-Elmer
Corp. v. Computervision Corp.,229 articulated a more traditional
standard on appeal after denial of a motion under Rule 50(b). The
appellate court, in part, recognized that the law presumes findings
in the absence of special interrogatories. However, debate contin218. Ogden Food Serv. Corp. v. Mitchell, 614 F.2d 1001, 1003 (5th Cir. 1980).

219. Kinnell v. Mid-Atlantic Mausoleums, Inc., 850 F.2d 958, 965-66 (3d Cir.
1988).
220. 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
221. Id. at 1547.
222. 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 1361.
723 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 (1984).
Id. at 1558 n.5.
744 F.2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).
Id. at 809.
723 F.2d at 1558 n.6.

229. 732 F.2d 888 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984).
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ues within the Federal Circuit as to the proper legal and factual
230
bases for reviewing jury verdicts.
III.

PRESUMPTIONS AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

A. Presumption of Validity
35 U.S.C. § 282 provides, inter alia, that "[a] patent shall be
presumed valid" and the burden of establishing invalidity "shall
rest on the party asserting it."231 The Federal Circuit first discussed this statutory presumption in Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip
Corp.232 The court explained at the outset that the presumption of
invalidity "is a procedural device, not substantive law."2 33 Nevertheless, the party asserting validity not only has the procedural
burden of proceeding first on that issue and establishing a prima
facie case, "but the burden of persuasion on the merits remains
with that party until final decision." 234 The Federal Circuit emphasized that the presumption is a constant: "Introduction of more pertinent prior art than that considered by the examiner does not,
therefore, 'weaken' or 'destroy' the presumption. Nor does such introduction 'shift' the basic burden of persuasion." 23 5
That same year, in Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp.,236 the Federal Circuit, although affirming a final judgment, went through the
unusual exercise of identifying and publishing errors of law in the
trial court's analysis. Several of the errors involved the presumption of validity. The trial court "implicitly" had required the patentee to prove that the prior art had been considered by the PTO. The
burden properly was on the party attacking validity to show that
the prior art had not been considered. Similarly, it was error for
the trial court to require the patentee to prove facts necessary to a
23 7
conclusion of nonobviousness.
In StructuralRubber Products Co. v. Park Rubber Co.,23 8 the
Federal Circuit defined several subpresumptions relating to validity. These include a presumption of novelty, a presumption of non230. See, e.g., Newell Co. v. Kenny Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 770-74 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (Newman, J., dissenting).
231. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1993).
232. 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
233. Id. at 1534.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 714 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
237. Id. The Federal Circuit concluded, however, that any error by the trial
court was harmless, based on underlying factual findings. But see, ACS Hosps.,
Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1974) (reviewing
court finding that the trial court's treatment of the presumption of validity was
incorrect as a matter of law and was not harmless error).
238. 749 F.2d 707 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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obviousness, and a presumption of utility.2 39 Subsequently, the
Federal Circuit explained that since the statute makes a patent
presumptively valid when issued, the presumption is applicable "to
240
all of the many bases for challenging a patent's validity."
B.

The Laches Presumption

There has long been a laches presumption that arises after six
years of delay. How this defensive presumption has evolved over
the ten years of the Federal Circuit's existence provides an interesting contrast with the presumption of validity.
1. The Relevant Statutory Framework
35 U.S.C. § 286 limits recovery for patent infringement to that
occurring in the six years prior to the date suit is filed. 24 1 It is not,

however, a true statute of limitations in the sense of barring an
action for infringement after the passage of six years. 24 2 This "gap"
in the law long has been filled by equitable defenses.
Campbell v. City of Haverhill 24 3 was an action at law for patent
infringement decided at a time when there was no federal restriction on stale patent litigation. The accused infringer asserted as a
defense a six year state statute of limitations applicable to tort
cases. Relying on the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction over patent suits, the patentee argued conversely that no time constraints
were applicable. 244 The Supreme Court rejected the patentee's argument and focused instead on the prejudice resulting from delay:
Unless... [the state statute of limitations applies] we have the anomaly of a distinct class of actions subject to no limitation whatever-a
class of privileged plaintiffs who, in this particular, are outside the
pale of the law, and subject to no limitation of time in which they may
institute their actions. The result is that users of patented articles,
perhaps innocent of any wrong intention, may be fretted by actions
brought against them after all their witnesses are dead, and perhaps
after all memory of the transaction is lost to them. This cannot have
239. Id. at 714.
240. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987).
241. See Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 108 F.2d 762, 763 (2d Cir. 1940).
The Pollen court stated that:
The provision in the patent law that there shall be no recovery for infringements committed more than six years before suit is not a mere statute of
limitation .... It is a condition on the right, not on the remedy, and it is not
subject to the disabilities or excuses by which ordinary statutes of limitation may be avoided by plaintiff.
Id.
242. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1030
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
243. 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
244. Id. at 614-15.
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24 5
been within the contemplation of the legislative power.

Two years later, Congress enacted 29 Stat. 694, providing a sixyear moving window for past damages in patent suits, whether at
law or in equity. 24 6 Nevertheless, laches remained a recognized defense both in the equitable form of patent litigation and in patent
actions at law for damages. 2 47 In 1915, Congress enacted 38 Stat.
956, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 398 (now repealed), which authorized
equitable defenses to be interposed in actions at law. 2 4 8 Courts relied upon this provision in applying laches (an equitable defense) to
bar stale patent damage actions. 24 9 28 U.S.C. § 398 subsequently
was deleted from 28 U.S.C. as surplusage when Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the procedural distinctions
between actions at law and suits in equity. 2 50 However, because
Rule 2 provides the same procedural rights previously set forth in
§ 398, the right to interpose the
equitable defense of laches in pat251
ent litigation remained viable.
The continued availability of laches as a defense-whether the
action is legal or equitable-also appears to be what Congress intended in the 1952 Patent Act. 25 2 35 U.S.C. § 282, sets forth the
defenses which may be raised in an action involving the validity or
infringement of a patent, including "noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement, or unenforceability." The word "unenforceability" was "added by amendment in the Senate for greater
clarity," with the purpose of including "equitable defenses such as
2 53
laches, estoppel and unclean hands."
245. Id. The Court also noted Justice Marshall's perceptive comment: "In a
country within which not even treason can be prosecuted after the lapse of
three years, it can scarcely be supposed that an individual would remain forever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture." Id. at 617 (citation omitted).
246. 29 Stat. 694 is currently codified at 35 U.S.C. § 286.
247. See, e.g., Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v. Greenawalt, 27 F.2d 823, 827
(2d Cir. 1928); Window Glass Mach. Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 284 F.
645, 648 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 623 (1923).
248. 28 U.S.C. § 398 (1940) (repealed). The statute did not create any new
defenses, but merely allowed equitable issues, otherwise available, to be raised
by answer, plea or replication rather than as a separate bill on the equity side of
court. See Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922).
249. See Banker v. Ford Motor Co., 69 F.2d 665, 666 (3d Cir. 1934); accord
Ford v. Huff, 296 F. 652 (5th Cir.1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 602 (1924).
250. See 28 U.S.C. § 398 note (1940 ed.); FED. R. Civ. P. 2 advisory committee's note 1; 2 JEREMY C. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

2.05[2],

at 2-33 n.49 (2d ed. 1991).
251. FED. R. Civ. P. 2, 8(e)(2); see also Technitrol, Inc. v. Memorex Corp., 376
F. Supp. 828, 831, (N.D. Ill. 1974), affd, 513 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1975) (rejecting
the argument that laches is inapplicable in a patent action which seeks only
damages for past harm).
252. See 35 U.S.C. § 282.
253. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 55
(1954); accord J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561, (Fed.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985).
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Evolution of the Laches Presumption

Laches is an affirmative defense. 254 One asserting it must
show (1) that the patentee delayed filing suit for an unreasonable
and inexcusable length of time from the date the plaintiff first knew
or reasonably should have known of its claim against the defendant
and (2) that such delay operated to the defendant's material prejudice. 2 55 If successful, laches (unlike estoppel) bars the recovery of
pre-filing damages only. Nevertheless, patentees who delay unreasonably in filing suit long have been required to explain their
256
inaction.
In a 1928 opinion, George J. Meyer ManufacturingCo. v. Miller
Manufacturing Co.,257 the Seventh Circuit discussed the interplay
of laches and estoppel. 258 The appellate court recognized that it
may be in the patentee's financial interest to unreasonably delay
suit.25 9 Balancing fairness to the patentee against fairness to the
accused infringer, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that in such situations damages for infringement committed prior to suit should be
withheld, but prospective relief should not. Turning to the facts of
the case, the reviewing court held that the fifteen year delay was
26 0
sufficiently long as to require the patentee to offer explanation.
Not only did the patentee fail to do so, but the court found mislead26 1
ing silence. Laches (and estoppel) were established.
Years earlier, in Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 26 2 the Supreme
Court placed the burden on the patentee to show excuse for de254. FED. R. Crv. P. 8(c).
255. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032

(1992) (en banc); see also Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1377-78
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
256. Window Glass Mach. Co. v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 284 F. 645, 650
(3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 623 (1923) ("When delay in prosecuting a
claim is so unusual as to carry with it the appearance of being unreasonable,...
there devolves upon a plaintiff the burden ..

257. 24 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1928).
258. Id. "Laches is a term that is often used carelessly and loosely. At times,
it has been defined in such a way as to eliminate all distinction between it and
estoppel.... This Court has attempted consistently to recognize and maintain
the essential differences. . . ." Id. at 506-07.
259. Id. "A patentee is therefore justified in waiting to ascertain whether
realizations equal expectations." Id. at 507. See also A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d

at 1033 ("[A] patentee may [not] intentionally lie silently and wait watching
damages escalate, particularly where an infringer, if he had had notice, could
have switched to a noninfringing product.") (Citations omitted.)
260. Meyer, 24 F.2d 505. The Meyer court stated that:
The 15 years that elapsed between the date of the issuance of the patent
and the commencement of the suit, during which time neither patentee nor

his assignee asserted rights under the patent, is so great as to cast upon
the appellants the duty of explaining their nonaction. This they did not
attempt to do.
Id. at 507-08.
261. Id. at 508.
262. 150 U.S. 193 (1893).
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lay. 2 63 The plaintiff had permitted at least eight years to elapse

before filing suit. During much of that time he had been employed
by the defendant and knew that the defendant used the patented
invention continually. The patentee forewent any complaint of infringement in the hopes of preserving then-existing "amicable relations" with the defendant/employer. Such "amicable relations"
apparently resulted in the patentee's continued employment at a
salary which was larger than any amount he would have been entitled to if he had only been paid a royalty. Suit was filed only after
his employment ceased. The Court concluded that this explanation
was tantamount to being a misrepresentation, and concluded that
26 4
the patentee had not carried its burden of excuse.
Prior to the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, the federal appellate courts had almost uniformly recognized and adopted the rebuttable presumption that a
delay of more than six years was prejudicial and unreasonable. 2 65
Since 1982, at least seven panels of the Federal Circuit had ap26 6
proved employment of that presumption.
Laches was first discussed by the Federal Circuit in Leinoff v.
Lewis Milona & Sons, Inc. 2 67 As an affirmative defense, the one
asserting laches normally must prove the unreasonableness of a delay in the filing of suit. However, by analogy to 35 U.S.C. § 286, the
appellate court held that a six year delay "is presumptively an un263. Id. at 201.

264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Olympia Werke Aktiengesellschaft v. General Elec. Co., 712
F.2d 74, 77 (4th Cir. 1983); Jensen v. Western Irrigation and Mfg., 650 F.2d
165, 168-69 (9th Cir. 1980); Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
616 F.2d 1315, 1326 (5th Cir. 1980); TWM Mfg. v. Dura Corp., 592 F.2d 346,
349 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); Maloney-Crawford Tank
Corp. v. Rocky Mountain Natural Gas Co., 494 F.2d 401, 403-04 (10th Cir.
1974) (dictum); Baker Mfg. v. Whitewater Mfg., 430 F.2d 1008, 1009, 1011 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 956 (1971); Jones v. Ceramco, Inc., 387 F.
Supp. 940 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 526 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1975). The Ninth Circuit
in Gillons v. Shell Co. of Californiaexamined the equitable roots of laches, stating that "injury is presumed from the statutory period of limitation in commonlaw actions, and, when equity adopts the statutory period, it adopts along with
it the presumption of injury, until the contrary is shown." Gillons v. Shell Co. of
California, 86 F.2d 600, 608 (9th Cir. 1936) (quoting McGrath v. Panama R. Co.,
298 F. 303, 304 (5th Cir. 1924)), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 689 (1937). The Ninth
Circuit adopted a six-year "analogous" period and, finding a nine-year delay,
affirmed laches. Id. at 608-11.
266. See Adelberg Lab., Inc. v. Miles, Inc., 921 F.2d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Meyers v. Brook Shoes Inc., 912 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Jamesbury Corp. v.
Litton Indus. Prod., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
828 (1988); Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Bott
v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Mainland Indus. Inc. v.
Standal's Patents Ltd., 799 F.2d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Leinoffv. Lewis Milona &
Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 741-42 (Fed. Cir. 1984), overruled by A.C. Aukerman
Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032.
267. Leinoff, 726 F.2d at 741-42.
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reasonable one for filing a patent infringement suit."268 It then defined the nature of that presumption. At the outset, the reviewing
court emphasized that the presumption was not irrebuttable. With
this caveat, it announced that "the presumption after six years
shifts the burden, however, to the patent owner now to prove the
existence and reasonableness of such an excuse." 26 9 In addition,
of showing lack of injury
the patentee "bears the additional burden
270
to the infringer caused by the delay."
MainlandIndustries,Inc. v. Standal'sPatents,Ltd.271 involved
an appeal after a jury finding that a patentee had carried its burden of proof to show reasonable excuse for delay in filing suit.
There was no dispute, however, that the burden properly had been
placed on the patentee. 2 72 Thereafter, the Federal Circuit on at
least five other occasions explicitly placed the burden of proof on the
excuse for
patentee to prove the existence and reasonableness of2an
73
delay exceeding six years and to show lack of injury.
However, in 1992, the Federal Circuit in A.C. Aukerman Co. v.
R.L. Chaides Construction Co. 274 concluded that as of August 1,

1975, the nature of this presumption had been changed by Rule 301
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which states:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains
throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
2 75
cast.

Aukerman announced that, under this rule, "a presumption is not
merely rebuttable but completely vanishes upon the introduction of
sufficient evidence to support a finding of the non-existence of the
2 76
presumed fact."
268. Id. at 741 (citations omitted).
269. Id. at 742.
270. Id.
271. 799 F.2d 746, 748-49 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
272. Id. The principal question was whether, as a matter of law, litigation in
non-United States forums could be considered in determining excusable delay.
The Federal Circuit concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion to allow the
jury to consider foreign litigation. Id. at 749.
273. See also Adelberg Lab., Inc. v. Miles, Inc., 921 F.2d 1267, 1270-71 (Fed.
Cir. 1990); Meyers v. Brook Shoes, Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prod., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988); Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See, e.g., Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570,
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987), overruled by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr.
Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
274. 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
275. FED. R. EVID. 301.
276. Id. at 1037.
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The Federal Circuit, in adopting this "bursting bubble" presumption sua sponte, seemingly failed to consider that the laches
presumption, like the presumption of validity, was provided for by
"Act of Congress," if not by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The laches defense, while not explicitly mentioned, clearly is encompassed within 35 U.S.C. § 282.277 When Congress enacts legislation, the wording of the statute is viewed in light of prior cases in
the area. 2 78 The presumption of laches was well established as of
1952. The Senate Committee Report which accompanied the legislation suggests that defenses to infringement were to be part of the
statute in their current form: "The defenses to a suit for infringement are stated in general terms, changing the language in the
present statute, but not materially changing the substance."2 79
Nevertheless, the Aukerman decision engrafted the "bursting bubble" version of a presumption onto laches.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
resolved a wide range of procedural questions over the first decade
of its existence. So long as attorneys continue to be advocates, however, the appellate court will continue to confront new procedural
issues.

277. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 414 (1963); Overstreet v.

North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 131-32 (1943).
279. S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 6 DONALD
CHISUM, PATENTS 19-12.

